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Registering Ideology in the Creation of Social Entrepreneurs: 
Intermediary Organizations, ‘Ideal Subject’ and the Promise of 
Enjoyment 
 
Pascal Dey and Othmar M Lehner 
 
Abstract Research on social entrepreneurship has taken an increasing interest in issues 
pertaining to ideology. In contrast to existing research which tends to couch ‘ideology’ in 
pejorative terms (i.e. something which needs to be overcome), this paper conceives of 
ideology as a key mechanism for rendering social entrepreneurship an object with which 
people can identify. Specifically, drawing on qualitative research of one of the most prolific 
social entrepreneurship intermediaries, the Impact Hub, we investigate how social 
entrepreneurship is narrated as an ‘ideal subject’ which signals toward others what it takes to 
lead a meaningful (working) life. Taking its theoretical cues from Luc Boltanski’s theory of 
justification and from recent affect-based theorizing on ideology, our findings indicate that 
becoming a social entrepreneur gets framed less as a matter of struggle, hardship and 
perseverance than of ‘having fun’. We caution that the promise of enjoyment which pervades 
portrayals of the social entrepreneur might cultivate a passive attitude of empty ‘pleasure’ 
which effectively forecloses the properly political. The paper concludes by discussing the 
broader implications this hedonistic rendition of social entrepreneurship has, thus suggesting a 
re-politicization of social entrepreneurship through a confronting with the ‘impossible’. 
 





More than a decade ago, when the buzz around social entrepreneurship was in full swing, 
Raymond Dart (2004) put forward a thought-provoking investigation of the legitimacy of 
social entrepreneurship. The main point advanced by Dart is that the legitimacy of social 
entrepreneurship was morally and not pragmatically based; that is, social entrepreneurship has 
morphed into a legitimate organizational form not necessarily because it stood the test of 
reality (read ‘it works!’), but because it was normatively connected to the dominant pro-
business ideology which sees market-based approaches as the only pertinent way of 
addressing social and ecological problems. Hence, what is at stake in Dart’s treaties on 
legitimacy is that social entrepreneurship is more an ideological creation than a robust (i.e. 
empirically validated) way of using market mechanisms to advance the common good. The 
observation of social entrepreneurship being an ideological creation is still timely, especially 
during a time which is so vehemently depicted as ‘post-ideological’ (Bell, 2000). It is thus one 
of the merits of Dart’s investigation to have cultivated sensitivity that the appeal of social 
entrepreneurship is due in no small part to its kinship with the hegemonic pro-business 
ideology (Eikenberry, 2009).  
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Though we agree with many of Dart’s assertions, we also believe that he too readily 
subsumes social entrepreneurship to a singular ideology. This is to deny that social 
entrepreneurship in many ways forms a response to the ‘global crisis of value’. Consider, as 
an example, how Harvard-based management guru Michael Porter recently employed social 
entrepreneurship to prefigure an alternative economy which suspends the dogmatic share-
holder ideology by identifying the fulfillment of social needs as a core-value of doing 
business (Driver, 2012). Or think of how social entrepreneurship has been portrayed as a 
hybrid organization which combines philanthropic and market ideologies in largely 
productive ways (Moss et al., 2011). These cursory examples indicate that social 
entrepreneurship is not necessarily reducing the domain of ideological values to a singular 
logic. Since even though commentators keep accusing social entrepreneurship research of 
being too wedded to the managerial ideology (Eikenberry, 2009; Hjorth, 2009; 2013; Jones & 
Murtola, 2012), we are reluctant to embrace this diagnosis uncritically. Social 
entrepreneurship often serves as a conceptual reference for ‘talking back’ to the hegemony of 
the pro-business ideology, whilst proving that alternative ideological standards of economic 
organizing are available. Arguably one of the most influential actors in transmitting what 
social entrepreneurship is and what it is capable of accomplishing are intermediary 
organizations such as Ashoka, the Schwab Foundation, the Unreasonable Institute or 
GoodCompany. Intermediary organization, alternatively referred to as promotion agencies, 
incubators or ‘field building actors’ (Nicholls, 2010), are highly effective in shaping the 
meaning of social entrepreneurship, and, importantly, in mediating the experience of nascent 
and early-stage social entrepreneurs. Consequently, aspiring to advance understanding of the 
ideologies intermediary organizations invoke to prompt others to think and act in particular 
ways, we revert to the Impact Hub as one of the most successful actors in advancing the cause 
of social entrepreneurship on a global scale. The focal attention is on how the Impact Hub 
employs social entrepreneurship as an exemplary account of what it takes to lead a virtuous 
(working) life. Specifically, we shed light on how the Impact Hub interweaves different 
ideologies to establish a relatively coherent, temporarily stable sense of social 
entrepreneurship as an ‘ideal subject’. An ideal subject thus forms a moral guide or yardstick 
which offers potential social entrepreneurs a sense of direction in their quest for greatness. In 
conducting our analysis, we rely upon the sociological work of Luc Boltanski (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005; Botlanski & Thévenot, 2006) which permits us to distinguish a total of seven 
generic ideologies that contain different justifications of how a ‘state of greatness’ can be 
achieved. Further, our investigation is predicated on the idea that any attempt at understanding 
the narration of social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject would be incomplete without 
consideration of the dimension of affect. Conceiving of affect as the beatific narratives which 
render a given ideology compelling (Glynos et al., 2012; Stavrakskis, 2008), we study how 
the Impact Hub interweaves such narratives to create a belief that becoming a social 
entrepreneur will eventually make life not only meaningful but also enjoyable.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After highlighting how ‘ideology’ has 
been used in previous research on social entrepreneurship, we conceptualize our own 
understanding of the term. After introducing our methodology and empirical case, we 
investigate how the intermediary organization narrates social entrepreneurship as an ideal 
subject which combines meaningfulness with the ability to enjoy. Taking issue with the 
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hedonistic rendition of social entrepreneurship, we conclude with a plea to re-think social 
entrepreneurship as a confrontation with the ‘impossible’. 
 
 
‘Ideology’ in Existing Research on Social Entrepreneurship  
Ideology has acquired increasing prominence in recent years as a means by which to examine 
and understand entrepreneurship as a politically shaped object of knowledge (notably Jones 
and Spicer, 2010; Ogbor, 2000). More recently, ideology has also been endorsed as a subject 
of study in the realm of social entrepreneurship research. There, ideology has been 
foundational to the critical turn that took place toward the end of the 2000s (e.g. Boddice, 
2009; Curtis, 2007; Dey & Teasdale, 2013; Mason, 2012). It probably goes without saying 
that the meaning of the term ‘ideology’ in existing research is quite heterogeneous. For 
instance, some critically inclined investigations have approached social entrepreneurship as a 
distinct ideology which, due to its commitment to values pertaining to the market sphere, 
engenders the commercialization of non-profit organizations (Eikenberry, 2009; Eikenberry & 
Kluver, 2004). In a similar vein, studies have looked at how the ideology of social 
entrepreneurship, being transmitted by various powerful actors such as policy makers, the 
media or academia, ‘impinges’ upon how practitioners think and act (e.g. Dempsey & 
Sanders, 2010; Dey & Steyaert, 2014; Levander, 2010). Exemplary in this regard is the 
investigation by Dempsey and Sanders (2010) which, based on a detailed analysis of 
autobiographies of successful social entrepreneurs, showed how iconic narratives normalize 
an understanding of meaningful work predicated upon notions of sleep deprivation, lack of 
spare time, inexistent personal life, long working hours. Another stream of research has 
studied how social entrepreneurship operates as part of a work of ideological imagination that 
shapes reality according to distinct political dogmas. Instructive in this regard is the work of 
Mason and Moran (forthcoming) which concerns itself with the specific role of social 
entrepreneurship in the English coalition government’s Big Society program. While officially 
touted as an effective means for unleashing civil society’s engagement in solving pressing 
societal problems, the authors maintain that the prime ideological function of social 
entrepreneurship is to abet cut-backs in essential public services. The focal attention of this 
research is how government actors use ideology to conceal the true aspirations underpinning 
their use of ‘social entrepreneurship’. This research is notable for how it raises awareness that 
social entrepreneurship is not necessarily a value-neural means for tackling social/ecological 
problems, but an ideological justification of a particular way of seeing things, and, by 
extension, a ‘censorship’ mechanism which forecloses certain understandings of the world 
(Dey, 2014).  
Despite the divergences among these different usages of ‘ideology’, there are some 
broad areas of overlap. Underlying virtually all of this research is the assumption that 
ideology works mainly to conceal the antinomy between ideological representations of social 
entrepreneurship and actual reality. The basic thinking thus is that ideological renditions of 
social entrepreneurship work primarily to veil the true nature of reality, hence forming a 
“distortion of communication, a disturbance to be eliminated” (Žižek, 1994, pp. 63-64). 
Evidently, ideology gets used mainly in a pejorative sense (Andersson, 2011). Such a negative 
exegesis fails to understand that ideology is a fundamental principle in securing social consent 
and harmony, and thus part and parcel of all functioning societies. Given that social 
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entrepreneurship scholars mainly connote ‘ideology’ in a negative sense, this prompts us to 
call for research which concerns itself with how ideology creates, rather than veils realities 
and subjects. Consequently, we in this paper adopt an affirmative outlook which conceives of 
ideology as a central mechanism for offering individuals an exciting model of their own 
potential and a moral justification of their role within society. Denoting ideology’s function in 
relation to assigning meaning to their experience of becoming a particular kind of being, the 
issue that we are going to address going forward is how ideology works to enact social 
entrepreneurship as an ideal subject which signals toward others how they can attain a 
virtuous life.  
 
Conceptualizing Ideology: Ideal Subject, Narratives and Affect 
Our conceptualization of ideology is stimulated by three basic considerations. First, ideology 
works to create ‘ideal subjects’. Second, narratives form the medium through which 
ideologies are interwoven into a relatively coherent, temporarily stable sense of how social 
entrepreneurs typically think and act. Third, the creation of an ideal subject through ideology 
involves two dimensions: signification (the level of meaning) and affect (the level of 
enjoyment).  
Concurring with Althusser (1971) that “all ideology has the function of ‘constituting’ 
concrete individuals into subjects” (p. 115), this paper thrives on the contention that ideology 
works primarily to shape the way people conduct themselves by suggesting particular 
normative orientations of what it means to lead a ‘good life’. To develop our argument, we 
invoke the notion of ‘ideal subject’ (alternatively referred to as ‘ideal self’; e.g. Wieland, 
2010) which comprises the process of putting in place a model of how individuals should 
ideally act and think. Ideal subject formulates a model of being which others can (and indeed 
should) emulate. Ideal subject in the present context is thought of as an exemplary 
construction of how social entrepreneurs typically think and act. A distinctive feature of ideal 
subject is its compulsive aspect: individuals who are addressed as social entrepreneurs are not 
simply free to immerse themselves in a social entrepreneurial career, but morally obliged to 
accept social entrepreneurship as their ‘true self’ (Dey & Steyaert, 2014). 
Expanding on Althusser’s subject-based rendition of ideology, we conceive of the 
creation of ideal subjects as being essentially a narrative accomplishment. Embracing Hall’s 
(1983) contention that the world is rendered meaningful via a process of language-mediated 
symbolization, we view narratives as determining what forms of subjects become imaginable and, 
conversely, unimaginable. Narratives can thereby take on different forms, such as rituals, myths, 
movie clips, blog and home-page entries or mundane conversations. Ideology thus pertains to 
the evaluative dimension underpinning particular narratives (Jameson, 1977). Ideologies are 
often not recognizable as ideology precisely since being rooted in our “‘everyday thinking’ 
which offers us frameworks of meaning with which to make sense of the world” (Hall & 
O’Shea, 2013, p. 9). The work of French sociologist Luc Boltanski is instructive for 
distinguishing different common sense ideologies upon which ideal subjects ultimately get 
based. Two texts by Boltanski are particularly relevant: in The New Spirit of Capitalism 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005) and On Justification (Boltanski & Thévenaut, 2006) Boltanski 
develops – based on a study of respectively canonical texts from political philosophy and 
management textbooks – an axiological matrix which identifies a total of seven ideological 
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‘regimes’ labeled respectively the inspirational, domestic, renown, civic, market, industrial, 
and projective regime (for details cf. Table 1).  
 











The regime of inspiration  
... emphasizes creativity and originality. The regime of inspiration stresses the accomplishment of 
the individual, not that of social collectives or society at large. 
The domestic regime  
...pertains mostly to the private sphere, particularly to the family. As such, the domestic regime 
emphasizes issues such as hierarchy, tradition and intimate social ties. 
The regime of opinion  
... homes in on the fame, recognition and dignity of human beings in public space. The regime of 
opinion thus stresses the ability to influence and attract others. 
The civic regime  
... stresses values of solidarity and respect. The principle value of the civic regime is justice. 
The market regime  
... concerns itself with buying-selling and competition. The main value of the market regime is 
profit.  
The industrial regime  
... puts technical and scientific approaches center stage. The key values of the industrial regime 
are performance and productivity. 
The projective regime 
... primarily stresses the value of flexibility as epitomized in how network organizations structure 
their activities around projects. 
 
These regimes entail different justifications concerning what it takes to achieve a ‘state of 
greatness’. They offer justifications of why a certain life-style is meaningful, morally sound or 
intellectually sensible. For us to get at the core of how social entrepreneurship is justified as 
an ideal subject which others must emulate, we draw on Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) to 
distinguish three basic patterns of justification: the first patterns (the security dimension) 
entails arguments emphasizing how individuals who engage as social entrepreneurs can 
provide be secured or secure themselves from impending risks. The second pattern (the 
fairness dimension) indicates how one’s engagement as a social entrepreneur can contribute to 
the common good. The third pattern (the excitement dimension) clarifies what is ‘stimulating’ 
about an involvement as a social entrepreneur.  
Whilst Boltanski permits us to grasp the semantic dimension (i.e. the level of 
meaning) of ideology, we assert that any attempt at understanding the ideological ‘grip’ of 
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social entrepreneurship would be insufficient without consideration of the dimension of 
affect. Drawing on affect-based theorizing on ideology (Glynos, 2001, 2008; Glynos et al., 
2012; Stavrakakis, 2008; Žižek, 1989, 1994, 1999), we assert that the creation of an ideal 
subject, to be pervasive, presupposes affect as the medium which makes a particular story 
compelling. An affective view does not so much point toward a sphere or experience outside 
ideology, but to those aspects of a given ideology which make this ideology ‘stick’. Affect 
gives ideology power by sketching out a sublime reality with which individuals can identify 
(Žižek, 1989). The guiding idea is that ideology has a fantasmatic dimension whose primary 
function is to make a given reality (such as social entrepreneurship) palatable by endowing it 
with a sense of harmony, fullness and enjoyment. Without this fantasy, ideology does not 
function (Žižek, 1989). As Glynos et al. (2012) maintain, ideology’s sense of enjoyment is 
expressed mostly through fantasies that interweave beatific and horrific narratives. Such 
affective narratives restore the belief in the possibility (of a future state) of harmony and 
fulfillment. By way of illustration, affect is ubiquitous in “moralizing literature that talks of a 
marvelous world which no one has ever really encountered” (Chiapello, 2003, p. 169) but 
which social entrepreneurs can possibly bring about. Moreover, portrayals of social 
entrepreneurship based upon charismatic individuals (Vasi, 2009) comprise an affective core 
which is palpable in how these narratives offer individuals (read potential social 
entrepreneurs) “attractive, exciting life prospects” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, pp. 24-25). 
The important thing to note about affect is not whether a given narrative is true or not with 
regard to its positive content (Žižek, 1994), but how it tries to compel individuals to identify 
with the narrative’s normative desideratum, thus making them think and act in a particular 
way.  
Applying this conceptualization of ideology to study how intermediary organizations 
establish social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject, we address the following interrelated 
questions.  
1. First, we ask which ideological regimes are invoked in the narratives of the Impact 
Hub to assign meaning to the experience of becoming a social entrepreneur.  
2. Second, we ask how the ideal subject of becoming a social entrepreneur is justified 
through recourse to arguments pertaining to security, fairness and excitement.  
3. Third, we ask how the ideal subject of becoming a social entrepreneur is made 
compelling through affective investments. 
 
Before presenting our findings, we will sketch out the methodological approach of our 
inquiry.  
 
Methodological Approach  
Case Overview 
Our investigation is based upon a single-site case study of the Impact Hub. The choice of the 
Impact Hub was purposive in that we believed that it represents one of the most influential 
intermediary organizations in promoting the cause of social entrepreneurship world-wide. The 
first Hub was founded in London in 2005, and has since then morphed into a global 
movement. While writing this article, the Hub Impact purportedly consisted of more than 
11’000 members, and 60 hubs distributed all over the world. Whilst aspiring to create the 
conditions that are conducive to the set-up of social entrepreneurial organizations, the Impact 
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Hub uses various measures, such as workshops, venture competitions, fellowship programs, 
prototyping sessions and spaces for ‘creative breakout, brainstorming and co-working’, to 
attain its objectives. What interested us most in our study were less the specific measures the 
Impact Hub employs to select, educate and coach individuals who have already expressed 
their desire to become social entrepreneurs. Instead, our main interest was on how the Impact 
Hub gives a general account to outsiders specifying how engagement in social 
entrepreneurship makes (working) life both meaningful and appealing.  
 
Data Gathering and Analytic Procedure 
Our analysis was based upon official narratives of social entrepreneurship produced and 
disseminated by the Impact Hub. The choice of publically available accounts is premised on 
the idea that such accounts contain the Impact Hub’s official understanding of social 
entrepreneurship which it deliberately uses to instill in individuals a desire become social 
entrepreneurs. Data gathering involved a systematic selection and storage of publically 
available narratives of social entrepreneurship as they occur on the Impact Hub’s homepage, 
PowerPoint presentations, annual and impact reports, promotion material, event flyers, 
movies, or photographic material. Narratives were collected between October 2012 and June 
2014. Our primary data set included 590 sources of text, which were stored in a Dropbox 
folder to guarantee access by the two authors. The two authors iteratively analyzed the data 
between October 2013 and September 2014. 
Our analysis proceeded in four steps. The first step involved the identification of text 
passages which explicitly dealt with social entrepreneurship. To this end, we read through the 
whole data set and inductively generated a list of 18 categories, involving headings such as 
‘inspiring’, ‘impact’, ‘measurement’, ‘business’, ‘purpose’, etc. We thereby relied upon the 
coding method suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The 18 categories, which were 
consensually negotiated between the two authors, were all entered into NVIVO software. The 
second step consisted of linking the 18 categories to the seven ideological registers suggested 
by Boltanski. With one exemption (i.e. the hedonistic regime, which will be discussed more 
thoroughly in the findings section), this matching was rather straightforward. This step 
symbolized the transition from the empirical, first-order narratives of the Impact Hub (i.e. the 
emic dimension of our research) to the etic part of our research which aspired to reflect the 
inductive insights through the prism of established knowledge (Morris et al., 1999). To 
identify the affective dynamic of the Impact Hub’s narratives, we in a third step closely read 
the texts with an eye on affective segments which make a given account compelling. This step 
calls attention to the often latent operation of fantasies in the official narrative of the Impact 
Hub, and how they worked to render social entrepreneurship appealing to the individual. The 
last step, then, consisted of writing up the case narrative, with particular emphasis being 
placed on the kind of ideal subject being constructed.	  To present our findings, we first present 
the case narrative along Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) three levels of ideological 
justification: the security dimension, the fairness dimension and the excitement dimension. 
Then, in a subsequent section, we problematize our findings by relating them to existing 
research on the ‘society of command enjoyment’.  
 
Findings  
Narrating Social Entrepreneurship as Ideal Subject  
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Truthful to its role as a social entrepreneurship promotion agency, the Impact Hub relies upon 
a progressive story which sketches out why others should become a particular kind of subject, 
that is, a social entrepreneur. As part of this, social entrepreneurship gets identified as a 
solution to some of today’s most pressing problems. Issues of concern being addressed by the 
Impact Hub span phenomena as diverse as environmental degradation, problems related to 
ageing (societies), food safety, global warming, poverty or social exclusion, to name but a 
few. ‘Social entrepreneurship’s thus produces new arguments about how issues of global 
concern can be effectively tackled through innovative and entrepreneurial solutions. The 
Impact Hub thereby ascribes itself the role of creating the conditions which eventually allow 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs to blossom. This involves, for instance, the provision of 
workshops, venture competitions, fellowship programs, prototyping sessions and spaces for 
‘creative breakout, brainstorming and co-working’. Underpinning the narratives of the Impact 
Hub is a fundamentally optimistic prospect: although it gets acknowledged that mankind is 
witnessing serious challenges, there is ostensibly no reason for despair as the entrepreneurial 
mechanisms, tools and solutions for ‘prototyping the future of business’ are already at hand. 
Offering a narrative that attributes a central role to the social change potential immanent to 
business initiatives, narratives of social entrepreneurship are perhaps less utopian than 
heterotopian insofar as they appeal to an already existing movement of prolific ‘change-
makers’. The ideal subject of social entrepreneurship gets envisioned as a purposive and 
inventive individual who aspires to lead a meaningful life by changing the way in which 
business is practiced. Such individualized stories of social entrepreneurship put in place a 
normative blueprint of the good (working) life which others can emulate. Yet, we must guard 
against the temptation of treating the plot of the individual entrepreneur as the only story 
transmitted by the Impact Hub, since the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur is not 
exhausted by social atomism. Thus, to advance understanding of the minute and 
heterogeneous ideological regimes which inform the ideal subject of being a social 
entrepreneur, we use the next sections to illuminate how the Impact Hub beckons to 
individuals to become a particular kind of person.  
	  
Security Dimension 
Security in Boltanski’s account forms that part of an ideology which demonstrates how 
people’s participation in a system such as capitalism provides security from existing 
vulnerabilities and impending risks. Arguably the ultimate risk associated with social 
entrepreneurship is failure (Scott & Teasdale, 2012). In policy and academic circles it has 
become commonplace to suggest that social entrepreneurs address the risk of failure by 
creating a sustainable revenue base. The prefix ‘sustainable’ thus chiefly alludes to revenues 
resulting from the application of market mechanisms (read earned income). Reflecting the 
market regime’s emphasis on trading activities, the general thinking is that neither 
contributions by government nor by donors form a pertinent source of revenue for social 
entrepreneurs. Academic narratives are rife with discussions of how trading and earned-
income strategies lead to financial self-sufficiency. In this way, trading activities represent the 
ultimate mechanism for making social enterprises “viable” (Anderson, Dees & Emerson, 
2002). Interestingly, whilst academics frequently envision the market regime as an antidote to 
the looming ‘death’ of social enterprises, this argument does not correspond with the narrative 
of the Impact Hub. Since even though the Impact Hub makes frequent mention of business 
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(e.g. identifying business as a way of mobilizing otherwise untapped resources), it does not go 
as far as positioning market mechanisms and principles as a means for fending off risks. 
Indeed, a conspicuous feature of the Impact Hub’s narrative is that it tends to give priority to 
social entrepreneurship’s potential and promise rather than to its backsides, obstacles and 
risks. Before tracing arguments explicitly dealing with the potential of becoming a social 
entrepreneur further down, it should be noted here that issues pertaining to security are in fact 
part of the Impact Hub’s narrative of social entrepreneur. Even though hard to detect on first 
sight, two relatively stable sets of arguments can be detected. The first argument links social 
entrepreneurship with innovativeness. Innovativeness is thereby delineated not only as the 
crucial mechanism for ‘saving the world’ (Sørensen, 2008), but as the pre-eminent means for 
securing the viability of the respective social enterprise. Arguments dealing with 
innovativeness often circulate around questions of which qualities, skills and abilities the 
social entrepreneur must possess so that a given idea, endeavor or enterprise can be protected 
from looming failure. The ideal subject implied in this story prefigures an individual who is 
attentive to novel opportunities and latent possibilities which only few others would be able to 
detect. Security is thus epitomized in the assumption that social entrepreneurs worth thinking 
of are precisely those who willingly accept that they must be innovative to ensure the survival 
of their ideas and organizations. Evidently, this imaginary reflects Boltanski‘s projective 
regime which heeds flexibility and adaptability on the part of the individual as the defining 
feature of security. Talk about innovativeness as a foundational attribute of the individual 
social entrepreneur also echoes the regime of inspiration whose central concern is the kind of 
creativity and originality being displayed by the individual.  
This said, one should not ignore that innovativeness cannot possibly be reduced to the 
level of the individual. What is crucially at stake is, as the Impact Hub notes, that ‘[i]mpact 
cannot happen in isolation’. A second argument dealing with security is thus based upon the 
notion of ‘collectiveness’. The collectivist dimension is most evident in text passages where 
the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneurship gets related to, for instance, the 
establishment of partnerships, participatory innovation processes, or quite generally to 
activities such as ‘co-production’ or ‘sharing’. A vital dimension of the ideal subject is how 
the process of becoming a social entrepreneur involves assembling people into a coherent 
collective. Evidently, the idea of collectiveness points to Boltanski’s domestic regime which 
avers that security can be achieved through adherence to values such as loyalty and 
trustworthiness. In line with the domestic regime, the Impact Hub makes is imperative to 
protect and care for the Hub collective, similar to how one would try to preserve one’s own 
family.  
This emphasis on collectivity is notable not least since it has been more or less absent 
in academic discussions, especially during the nascent stage of social entrepreneurship 
research (Dacin et al., 2011). Moreover, notions of ‘collectiveness’ are always already an 
affective construction, rather than an accurate and reliable description of reality. Since even 
though it would be easy to prove that collectiveness is not a bullet-proof antidote against 
entrepreneurial risks such as failure, the truly interesting point to note is how ‘collectiveness’ 
works affectively to convey the promise that individual social entrepreneurs cannot possibly 
fail precisely because they are part of a greater collective of like-minded people. It is hence by 
purporting that individuals are not left to their own devices that narratives of the Impact Hub 
get to offer individuals a ‘foundational guarantee’ (Glynos, 2008) that shields them from the 
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typical insecurities and risks related to entrepreneurial endeavors. Inherent in this view is the 
assumption of collectiveness being a means for achieving particular ends (i.e. security). 
Before proceeding, it should be borne in mind that collectiveness does not only form a means 
toward other ends, but is frequently positioned as an end in itself. We will add more flesh to 
this insight in conjunction with the discussion of the excitement dimension further down. 
Whilst our analysis of the security dimension has revealed how narratives of social 
entrepreneurship hark back to the projective regime, the domestic regime and the regime of 
inspiration, the ensuing two sub-chapters will exemplify the role of further ideologies in 
setting up social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject  
 
Fairness Dimension 
Fairness involves arguments on how a certain way of life contributes to the public interest and 
the common good. In Boltanski’s foundational work on the ideological justification of 
capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005), fairness plays an obvious role since it is not self-
evident that an individual’s participation in the capitalist economy will necessarily yield 
results that are beneficial for everyone. In the case of the Impact Hub, however, fairness is not 
a justification in the conciliatory sense of the term. In contrast to Boltanski’s ‘new spirit of 
capitalism’, which tried to justify capitalism in the face of its negative ramifications such as 
exploitation, alienation, over-work, etc., the Impact Hub is not charged with such 
legitimization pressures precisely because fairness is not an addendum but the very essence of 
social entrepreneurship. Hence, instead of trying to vindicate social entrepreneurship in the 
face of negative evidence and criticism, the Impact Hub simply gives an account of how 
individuals, by becoming social entrepreneurs, contribute to the common good. Whilst the 
common good is illustrated in various ways, it gets signified quite frequently in conjunction 
with notions of social (and ecological) impact. Notions of ‘impact’ occur not only in the name 
of the intermediary (nomen est omen), but are also a central part of its incubator activities (see 
f.i. the Social Impact Award) as well as its official rhetoric. The idea of impact as it gets 
narrated by the Impact Hub epitomizes Boltanski’s civic regime which heeds the rights of the 
collective and associated principles of solidarity and justice. On the other hand, narratives of 
‘impact’ reveal similarities with the industrial regime which identifies as one of the most 
pressing tasks aspects of effectiveness, performance and productivity. These values are 
chiefly in line with academic and policy articulations which also use ‘performance’ as a 
“powerful element in the case for social entrepreneurship” (Martin, 2004, p. 14). An 
immediate clarification is in order here. Even though a spirit of ‘getting things done’ and a 
drive for performance at large are important components of the narrative of social 
entrepreneurship, perhaps one of the clearest effects of the Impact Hub’s narratives is to 
undermine the idea of performance as it is understood in the context of strictly profit-driven 
enterprises. That is to say, squarely in contradiction with Boltanski’s industrial regime which 
conceives of performance, productivity and efficiency against the background of traditional 
businesses, performance in the case of the Impact Hub takes on a much broader meaning. In 
concrete terms, performance brings with it a new logic of creation in which values of 
performance and efficiency are inextricably interlinked with the idea of the co-production of 
the common good. So understood, we can see that ‘performance’ in the Impact Hub’s account 
effectively conjoins the industrial and the civic regime, thus essentially merging formerly 
contradictory logics of civicness and industrial production.  
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At closer inspection, an ambivalence at the heart of ‘performance’ comes into focus. 
Although the narratives of the Impact Hub are rife with discussions of how social enterprises 
and entrepreneurs engender social and ecological impact, the intermediary makes no 
secret that measuring such performances is anything but trivial. Though conceding that the 
production of solid evidence of social impact might prove challenging, the Impact Hub adopts 
a sanguine position by suggesting that what really matters is less the ‘hard evidence’ of 
impact but the individual’s commitment to performance. The Impact Hub thus averts the 
potential charge of paying too little attention on measuring social impact by contending that 
what really matters is that individuals feel an urge to ‘make a difference’. So, even though the 
classical management procedures as they relate to, for instance, strategizing, measurement 
and accountability are still implicated in the social entrepreneurial journey, the process of 
becoming a social entrepreneur gets delineated as being contingent on psychological factors 
such as dedication, motivation and passion, rather than on the application of measurable 
solutions. Bluntly put, the ideal subject emanating from this account does not produce an 
emphasis on ‘real’ performance but a psychological ‘will to perform’. This image thus offers 
a very particular, and one-sided understanding of performance that homes in on the 
motivational factors of the individual, and thereby fails to acknowledge the pragmatic 
dimension of change endeavors. 
 
Excitement Dimension  
In Boltanski’s account, excitement involves those justifications which seek to convince 
people of how their engagement in capitalism would animate and enliven them. We can trace 
several ways in which social entrepreneurship gets imagined as a source of excitement. For 
instance, the excitement involved in becoming a social entrepreneur is crucially related to an 
eschatological belief in the redemptive qualities of market logics and practices (Dey & 
Steyaert, 2010). As briefly discussed above, a sense of excitement is enacted through 
narratives stressing how the innovative deeds of the individual social entrepreneur ultimately 
benefit society as a whole. Similarly, a sense of excitement emanates through recourse to the 
notion of ‘collectivitity’ (cf. above) which invites us to think about the journey of becoming a 
social entrepreneurship in terms of ‘sharing’, ‘collaborating’, ‘discussing’, ‘joining’, etc. 
Having mentioned previously that collectivity forms an essential ingredient of the security 
dimension, it is in the context of the excitement dimension that the term takes on a slightly 
different meaning. That is, collectivity becomes a source excitement by way of how the 
experience of becoming a part of a global movement of like-minded people gets depicted as a 
teleology or end in its own right. Regardless of whether collectivity eventually permits the 
social entrepreneur to set up a viable enterprise, the mere act of becoming a member of the 
Impact Hub community is positioned as an end in itself. 
 A pervasive component of the excitement dimension of social entrepreneurship is how 
it emulates the regime of opinion, particularly its focus on honor and fame. What one is bound 
to see in narratives embodying a sense of excitement is how a career as a social entrepreneur 
involves becoming visible and recognizable in the public sphere through, for instance, award 
ceremonies, presentations or marketing and public relations activities. Perhaps the dominant 
regime in conjuring a sense of excitement is the inspired regime, which values the passion and 
creativity of the individual genius. However, this is not entirely accurate. A focal attention of 
the inspired regime in Boltanski’s account is full commitment to the risks of one’s enterprise 
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and an acceptance of all the costs a given journey might entail. In contrast thereto, the 
narrative of the Impact Hub does not contain any mention of, for instance, hardship and 
obstacles which might occur in the social entrepreneurial journey. Succinctly put, the Impact 
Hub purports that becoming a social entrepreneur does not necessarily presuppose any 
sacrifices on the part of the individual. A sense excitement emerges precisely due to how 
narratives eclipse all those experiences of hardship and suffering which might prevent people 
from embarking upon a career as a social entrepreneur. Consequently, excitement results from 
the suggestion that the realization of the common good does not necessarily require that 
people fully dedicate their lives to their social entrepreneurial endeavor, thus potentially 
exposing themselves to risks of self-exploitation or exhaustion (cf. Dempsey & Sanders, 
2010). Quite the contrary, the Impact Hub’s stories of progress which sketch out how social 
entrepreneurs use business tools to shape the future is criss-crossed by a narrative which 
promotes social entrepreneurship as a genuinely pleasurable experience in the ‘here and now’. 
The Impact Hub thereby displaces the traditional opposition between the sphere of work 
(which embodies values and virtues such as duty, obligation or responsibility) and the idea of 
enjoyment (which is mainly seen as part of the experience of leisure time). Examples can be 
found in descriptions which equate the process of becoming a social entrepreneur with the 
experience of ‘being inspired’, ‘assessing creative energy’ and connecting with 
‘compassionate individuals focused on a common purpose’. On the face of it, narratives of 
social entrepreneurship as an experience of enjoyment effectively supersedes the linear (and 
dare we say ‘reductionist’) narrative of social entrepreneurship as a way of using business 
management to advance the common good. The lynchpin of the Impact Hub’s narrative is the 
conviction that becoming a social entrepreneur allows individuals to ‘have fun’. In essence, 
becoming a social entrepreneur renders the individual’s life meaningful not necessarily by 
connecting it to a higher cause but by transforming it into a hedonistic journey. Participation 
in a social entrepreneurial career is hence presented not merely as a ‘higher calling’ (Dempsey 
& Sanders, 2010), but as a potential source of affective enlightenment. The narrative of the 
Impact Hub compels the individual to become a social entrepreneur by exemplifying the kind 
of emotional experiences she or he can reap from such an engagement. In this way, the ideal 
subject gets envisioned as an individual whose engagement as a social entrepreneur 
is primarily driven by the prospect of pleasurable experiences. This imaginary in 
turn subordinates a more thoroughgoing debate on ethical and political issue of social 
change to the imperative of enjoyment. It is to this conundrum that we turn in the next section.  
 
The Promise of Enjoyment and the Depoliticizing Social Entrepreneurship 
It is obvious from what has just been said that social entrepreneurship cannot possibly be 
regarded as a mere mimesis of the triumph of the market (Dart, 2004) since the ideal subject 
being revealed in our analysis clearly exceeds common understandings of business as a form 
of organizing with primarily economic finalities. At heart, becoming a social entrepreneur 
purportedly opens up a new way of doing business, which for its success requires 
innovativeness and a ‘will to perform’ on the part of the individual. It is here that we can trace 
an important tension of social entrepreneurship. On the one hand, social entrepreneurship 
represents a deeply individualistic undertaking. Conversely, the ideal subject entails notions 
of collectiveness, which takes its ideological cues from the domestic regime and its associated 
values of loyalty and trustworthiness which are characteristic of the family. To complexify 
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things even further, our results indicate that the ideal subject embodies – although to a 
different degree – all of the seven ideological regimes described by Boltanski. Despite the 
apparent heterogeneity on the level of ideological meanings, narratives of social 
entrepreneurship are eventually united by an affective core. This ‘core’ consists of how the 
prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur gets depicted as an essentially pleasurable 
experience. More precisely, one of the key features of the ideal subject is that it combines a 
sense of urgency with the possibility of enjoyment. Conflating more traditional notions of 
‘performance’, ‘scaling’ or ‘impact’ with affectively charged terms such as ‘inspiration’ or 
‘being energized’, the narrative of the Impact Hub shapes the understanding of social 
entrepreneurship in ways that are amenable not only to the logic of the market regime but also 
to what could be called ‘hedonistic regime’.  
The coalescence of the trajectories of ‘doing good’ and ‘having fun’ is interesting not 
least in light of recent debates on social entrepreneurship as a source of ‘meaningful work’. In 
a nutshell, there is a tentative consensus that social entrepreneurship offers individuals a 
meaningful work prospect based upon values such as, for instance, integrity, empathy, 
spirituality, compassion or honesty (e.g. Mort, Weerawardena & Carnegie, 2003). A 
conspicuous aspect of this debate is that it has concerned itself mainly with explicitly moral 
virtues. In contrast thereto, the figure of the social entrepreneur emanating from the narrative 
of the Impact Hub makes no distinction between virtues of ‘doing good’ and egotistical 
intentions of ‘having fun’. Cast as an inherently pleasurable endeavor, getting immersed in a 
career as a social entrepreneur marks less a fulfillment of some higher purpose than a 
hedonistic injunction to enjoy. Before we get to problematize the hedonistic regime further 
down, it is important to first note that the promise of enjoyment results, at least in part, from 
how the Impact Hub avoids any detailed discussion of the struggles and hardship associated 
with social entrepreneurship or the underlying political and structural causes of today’s most 
pressing problems (Fyke & Buzzanell, 2013). This avoidance of the intricacies and 
predicaments of social entrepreneurship is a precondition for rendering social 
entrepreneurship a career prospect which appears attractive and which individuals can hence 
embrace. 
Together, these insights urge us to address the broader implications of the Impact 
Hub’s account of social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject. Perhaps the most conspicuous 
feature of the Impact Hub’s narrative is that it precipitates a shift away from seeing social 
change mainly as an undertaking informed by tangible ethical or political objectives. Indeed, 
the hedonistic interpretation of the ideal subject diverts attention from seeing social change as 
predicated upon antagonistic, confrontational engagements with practices and belief systems 
of the dominant political economy. To be sure, we are not suggesting that the Impact Hub a 
priori excludes social entrepreneurial start-ups with explicitly political ambitions and 
missions. Even a cursory glance at the homepages of the different Impact Hubs will reveal 
that political social enterprises, such as advocacy organizations which try to raise awareness 
for silenced societal issues (such as HIV amongst young adults), are part of the intermediary’s 
portfolio. Our concern is thus related more to how official narratives of the Impact 
Hub exclude the political underpinning of social enterprises by glossing over the fact that any 
attempt at producing change, even if based on ostensibly ‘neutral’ market mechanisms, are 
inherently political insofar as they (aspire to) alter existing social orders and relations of 
power.  
	   15	  
To put things into broader perspective, we can see that the hedonistic regime and its 
promise of enjoyment, which was not yet part of Boltanski’s elaborate treatise, reflects recent 
ideological shifts which have taken place in many advanced liberal societies. More precisely, 
the promise of enjoyment which is at the heart of the Impact Hub’s narrative of social 
entrepreneurship is an exemplary example of the passage from a ‘society of prohibition’ to a 
‘society of commanded enjoyment’ (McGowan (2004, p. 2). This imperative to enjoy reflects 
the ideological desideratum of consumer society, and thus prefigures a rather new mode of 
individual conduct and social production. Until very recently, a pervasive feature of social 
organization was that people were required to renounce enjoyment, for enjoyment formed a 
risk to the stability of the society. What McGowan refers to as ‘societies of prohibition’ 
echoes Max Weber’s notion of the protestant ethic as an ideological system which normalized 
an ethos of hard work, asceticism and a renouncement of private pleasures. In this universe, 
the imperative is to abstain from all forms of enjoyment during one’s worldly life. Today, this 
logic has been firmly put on its head: the primary duty of the subject in consumer society is 
no longer to renounce enjoyment but to enjoy as much as possible (Stavrakakis, 2010). In 
today’s societies of commanded enjoyment, which in McGowan’s view characterizes the era 
of late capitalism, the proper life no longer consists of sacrificing enjoyment for the sake of 
social order, but precisely to free oneself from values such as self-control, moderation, 
restraint and hard work (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005), and to identify hedonistic pleasures as 
the categorical imperative. Whilst it is not difficult to see that the Impact Hub’s narrative of 
social entrepreneurship corresponds, in an almost perfect sense, with what has just been said 
about the society of commanded enjoyment, it is particularly important to attend to the 
dangers associated with this nexus. Ultimately, the culture of ‘having fun’ strips social 
entrepreneurship of much of its progressive value. The strong ambition to attain social change 
does not disappear from narratives of social entrepreneurship, but takes on a de-politicized 
form by moving from a focus on struggle, opposition and antagonism to a range of non-
confrontational practices and initiatives. In this way, the Impact Hub tends to normalize a 
view of social entrepreneurship that does not open up ‘new worlds’, but mainly fosters a 
superficial engagement with reality. The imagery of social entrepreneurship being created by 
the Impact Hub ultimately risks engendering a ‘worldless’ ideological constellation (Žižek & 
Badiou, 2005), which deprives would-be social entrepreneurs of any sense of the political and 
ethical urgencies which require attention.  
 
Concluding Thoughts  
The possibilities for progressive social change have underpinned many recent debates in 
Management and Organization Theory in general and Business Ethics more specifically. 
Social entrepreneurship takes centre stage in these debates. It is thus fairly uncontroversial to 
claim that few concepts have been as successful in vying for the attention of academic, media 
professional or politicians (Fyke & Buzzanell, 2013). However, one should not be seduced 
into believing that social entrepreneurship has remained unscathed. The truth is that the 
subject matter has been subjected to various forms of critique. At least a few of those critiques 
have used theories of ideology to pinpoint the true reality which is hidden behind the veneer 
of euphoria produced by spectacular representations of social entrepreneurship (Mason & 
Moran, forthcoming). Although we generally embrace critical research on social 
entrepreneurship, we also believe that existing ideological analyses might have too readily 
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reduced social entrepreneurship to a singular value: the market logic. The principle concern of 
this article has been to show that although social entrepreneurship signifies the increasing 
reliance on market mechanisms and practices as a preferred way of instigating social change, 
it would still be untenable to suggest that social entrepreneurship is a mono-logical creation. 
Whilst the principle purpose of our investigation was to challenge the ‘dominant ideology’ 
thesis exemplified at the outset of this paper (cf. Dart, 2004), three insights merit particular 
attention.  
First, and directly related to what has just been said, a key contribution which our 
investigation of the Impact Hub makes is to demonstrate that social entrepreneurship is ‘over-
determined’ (Althusser, 2005) in the sense of being shaped by multiple ideologies. Having 
disclosed how the narration of social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject balances a variety of 
ideologies, our findings have made it evident that social entrepreneurship ultimately 
represents a “Wittgensteinian ‘family’ of vaguely connected and heterogeneous [ideological] 
procedures” (Žižek, 1994, p. 67). Having offered a ‘first cut’ at understanding the 
polymorphous ideological foundation of social entrepreneurship, Boltanski’s work has been 
instrumental for gaining a better understanding of how intermediary organizations narrate 
social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject via different ideological regimes which offer 
specific justifications as to what it means to lead a virtuous (working) life. Whilst many 
ideological regimes being invoked by the Impact Hub have a very long history (Boddice, 
2009), our inquiry raises some interesting issues about the notorious debate around social 
entrepreneurship’s status of novelty. In light of our findings, it appears that most ideologies 
being employed in the narratives of the Impact Hub are historical rather than new. What 
might be new, though, is the way in which the different ideological regimes are combined and 
interwoven into a relatively stable assemblage of meaning. Specifically, the Impact Hub has 
offered interesting insights with regard to how ‘social entrepreneurship’ gets used to forge 
links between values which hitherto seemed incompatible. Perhaps the most revealing 
example involves how the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur conflates traditional 
notions of doing business with hedonistic values of enjoyment. This said, we are mindful that 
further research is needed to add both detail and nuance to our understanding of how 
intermediaries interweave different ideological registers in practice.  
Second, a key insight of our investigation is that ideology does not work primarily to 
conceal and obscure, but to make the ideal subject of the social entrepreneur as palatable to as 
many people as possible. Recent affect-based theorizing on ideology has put us in a better 
position to understand how narratives of social entrepreneurship are structured through 
fantasies, thus eventually rendering social entrepreneurship an appealing career prospect for 
the individual. Essentially, our findings contribute to ongoing efforts to understand the 
ideological mechanisms which normalize specific views of what makes work and life 
meaningful. The Impact Hub serves as a paradigmatic example of a fundamental shift in how 
work is presented not only as necessary (e.g. as a way of securing income), but as attractive 
and exciting. Importantly, social entrepreneurship does not so much offer a moralized 
blueprint of meaningful (work) life (read a ‘higher calling’; cf. Dempsey & Sanders, 2010), 
but a hedonistic culture of ‘having fun’. By implication, our investigation draws attention to 
how attempts at persuading individuals to become social entrepreneurs comprise an affective 
side. Although much of this might appear self-evident, which, however, only testifies to how 
habituated we have become to the affective grip of the rhetoric of intermediary organizations, 
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one must not forget that the promise of enjoyment might eventually be the driving motif 
behind individuals’ decision to become social entrepreneurs. A pressing task for future 
research hence consists of directly addressing the specific motives and desires of would-be 
social entrepreneurs, placing heed on the extent to which these individuals are drawn into a 
social entrepreneurial career solely due to of hedonistic considerations. 
Third, having demonstrated that the conflation of social change and the culture of 
‘having fun’ eventually forecloses the properly political, our findings compel us to make 
room for “alternative views which are often in conflict with the wave of euphoria and 
optimism that is driving current theoretical development in the field of social enterprise and 
entrepreneurship” (Bull, 2008, p. 272). Because even though some commentators have 
suggested that the promise of enjoyment creates a sense of possibility which is conducive to 
political action (e.g. Gibson-Graham, 2006), we feel that the hedonistic rendition of social 
entrepreneurship merely gives rise to a sense of empty ‘pleasure’. Any ambition to counter-
act this stalemate by enlivening the political dimension of social entrepreneurship prompts 
intriguing questions as to how, i.e. based upon which alternative ideologies, social 
entrepreneurship should be rearticulated. Having reached a decisive point in our argument, we 
must not be tempted to make hasty decisions with regard to the positive content of social 
entrepreneurship. Crucial here is again the status of ideology. As a general rule, whenever we 
aspire to suggest alternative meanings of social entrepreneurship, chances are that we simply 
exchange one ideology with another, thus potentially perpetuating the problem we set out to 
solve in the first place (Daly, 2004). Given that there is no space beyond ideology and the 
fantasies which sustain it, it might make little sense to try to dictate in an authoritative fashion 
what social entrepreneurship should be in terms of its positive content. Instead, it might prove 
more productive to engage in a critical practice of nonclosure (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Such 
a practice should be geared toward keeping the field of signification open by destabilizing the 
seeming wholeness and ‘coziness’ of dominant accounts of social entrepreneurship. Revealing 
how affect works to create the illusion of harmony, being critical of social entrepreneurship is, 
on the one hand, about dismantling the false promise of enjoyment and, on the other, about 
learning to embrace a different kind of enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2010) by establishing social 
entrepreneurship as “a utopia which [...] gains jouissance [enjoyment] of impossibility itself” 
(McMillan, 2012, p. 177). The idea of impossibility, which is at the core of Žižek’s (2006) 
political philosophy, invites us to re-think social entrepreneurship not as something which is 
de facto impossible. Practically speaking, such a demand would make little sense. Following 
Žižek, the duty is to relate social entrepreneurship with demands that profoundly challenge 
the dominant social imaginary. Re-politicizing social entrepreneurship thus involves a passage 
from impossibility to contingency so that “what appeared impossible, what did not belong to 
the domain of possibilities, all of a sudden – contingently – takes place, and thus transforms 
the coordinates of the entire field” (Žižek, 2006, p.77). A central concern for future research 
should be to engage directly with intermediary organization, thus asking fundamental 
questions as to how social entrepreneurship can be rethought as a force that explodes the 
limits of the possible.	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